Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Federal Court Of Appeals Reminds Us That Pregnancy Discrimination Act Only Requires Equal (Not Better) Treatment For Pregnant Employees; But Take Note That Connecticut State Law Differs.
By Hugh W. Cuthbertson
In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), which amended the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include discrimination in employment “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” On January 9, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia, issued a decision (Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.) reminding us that the PDA requires only that pregnant employees be treated the same as (not better than) nonpregnant employees.
The Facts
The plaintiff, Peggy Young, was a part-time driver for UPS. The essential functions of her job required her to be able to lift packages up to 70 pounds and to assist in moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds. While on pregnancy leave in September 2006, Young gave her supervisor a doctor’s note stating that she could not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her pregnancy and not more than 10 pounds thereafter.
UPS had a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) providing temporary alternative work (“TAW”) to employees “unable to perform their normal work assignments due to an on-the-job injury. To comply with this provision, UPS offered light duty work to those employees injured while on the job or suffering from a permanent impairment cognizable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Under UPS policy and its CBA, a pregnant employee was permitted to continue working so long as she could perform the essential functions of her job, but was ineligible for light duty work (i.e., TAW) for any limitation arising solely from her pregnancy.
UPS informed Young in September 2006 that its policy would not permit her to continue working as long as she had a 20-pound lifting restriction. In October 2006 Young provided UPS a note from a midwife containing the same lifting restriction, but subsequently requested to return to work, insisting that she was rarely required to lift 20 pounds, that other employees had agreed to help her, if needed, and that she was willing either to do light duty work or her regular job. UPS, however, concluded that Young was ineligible for light duty work, because her lifting restriction was not the result of an on-the-job-injury, and was otherwise unable to perform the essential functions of her job. Young was not permitted to return to work and went on an extended unpaid leave of absence in November 2006. Young gave birth in April 2007 and subsequently returned to work for UPS.
Young filed suit in October 2008 alleging disability discrimination under the ADA and discrimination on the basis of race, sex and pregnancy under Title VII and the PDA. The district court ruled in favor of UPS on each of Young’s claims. With respect to the PDA claim, the court found that Young had failed to identify any similarly situated “comparator” (i.e., a nonpregnant employee) who received more favorable treatment than she did, and that she could not show that UPS’s non-discriminatory rationale (Young was unable to perform the essential functions of her job and was ineligible for light duty assignment under UPS policy) was a pretext for discrimination.
The Appellate Court’s Decision
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court rejected Young’s central argument in support of her PDA claim that the UPS policy limiting light duty work to some employees – those injured on-the-job or disabled within the meaning of the ADA – but not to pregnant workers, violated the PDA. The court also rejected the similar claim that the PDA requires employers to provide pregnant workers light duty work so long as it does so for any other workers similar in their ability or inability to work.
The court of appeals explained that although it is discriminatory under the PDA to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions, the PDA does not require employers to make it easier for pregnant women to work. In other words, employers can treat pregnant women as well or as poorly as they treat similarly affected employees who are not pregnant. There was no requirement for UPS to treat pregnant employees who need light duty work better than other employees with a similar medical need but whose conditions arose off-the-job. The Fourth Circuit adhered to the majority view that where a policy treats pregnant and nonpregnant workers alike, the employer has complied with the PDA. While the court conceded that the UPS policy could be characterized as uncharitable, it ruled that a lack of charity does not amount to discrimination.
Connecticut law
Connecticut courts look for guidance to federal court decisions in enforcing Connecticut’s antidiscrimination statutes. However, employers should be aware that Connecticut’s Fair Employment Practices Act not only prohibits pregnancy discrimination, but also provides several additional protections for pregnant employees not required under federal law.
For example, a Connecticut employer may not refuse to grant a pregnant employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy. Thus, even if all available leave has been exhausted for other reasons, a woman must be granted additional “reasonable” leave to give birth to a child or to recover from a disability caused by her pregnancy. In addition, a private employer in Connecticut may not fail or refuse to reinstate an employee returning from pregnancy leave to her “original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credit upon her signifying her intent to return unless … the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.” Other employer obligations also exist regarding a pregnant employee’s transfer (and eligibility for transfer) to a more suitable temporary position during her pregnancy.
Legal Significance
Connecticut employers should take note, therefore, that even though federal law does not require employers to provide greater protections for pregnant employees than those provided for nonpregnant employees, Connecticut’s parallel antidiscrimination statute does in fact provide certain protections to pregnant employees in addition to those that are available to employees who are not pregnant.
For any questions regarding this topic, please feel free to contact the author of this blog or any of his colleagues.